Closes#5Closes#6
An F-Droid repo is a signed index plus the files it names, and a partial
upload could previously leave them disagreeing: aws s3 sync walks the tree
in its own order, so an interrupted publish could land the index before the
APKs it names, breaking the repo for every client until the upload finished
or was rolled back. publish.sh now uploads in two passes, unconditionally --
every non-index file first, the index (index-v1.json(.asc), index-v2.json,
entry.json, entry.jar) last -- so an interruption anywhere in pass 1 simply
leaves the repo describing the old state a little longer, never a mixture.
Credentials are also verified with one real authenticated call
(head-bucket) before either pass, rather than merely checking the
environment variables are non-empty, since an unusable-but-present
credential failing halfway through is exactly how a partial upload happens.
next-version-code.sh is the one implementation of the versionCode rule
(candidate = minutes since 2026-01-01Z, clamped to strictly exceed whatever
is already published for that applicationId), shared by CI and manual
builds so there is exactly one place this can drift. bit pointed out
(appended to #6) that the clamp is monotonic against *observed* state, not
monotonic by construction: two jobs starting in the same minute can both
read the same published value and race to publish the same versionCode on
different APKs. Nothing can prevent that wasted build, so publish.sh now
also refuses to overwrite an already-existing APK object before pass 1 --
turning the collision from a silent, permanent wrong state into a loud
failure at the last moment the information is reliable.
Tested offline (83 assertions: pure-stdlib suites for both scripts, the
real CLIs through with-nixpkgs.sh, and a small local HEAD-only S3 stub
proving the credential check is a real authenticated call and the
APK-collision refusal fires only when it should) and live against
fdroid-weblib-dev (7 more: a real publish observed mid-flight via a
same-process synchronization hook to prove the index is genuinely absent
while the file is already present, both objects reading back
byte-identical, and a second publish refused against a real
already-published APK with its bytes left unchanged).
Co-authored-by: bit <bit@das-labor.org>
Measured against the real endpoint, not inferred: every PutObject failed
with
An error occurred (InvalidRequest) when calling the PutObject
operation: Bad request: invalid checksum algorithm
on aws-cli/2.34.24. Recent awscli2 attaches a checksum algorithm by
default and Garage refuses it, so publish.sh could not upload anything --
after passing its entire test suite.
It also reads as a permissions problem, which is the expensive part: reads
succeed, writes fail, and it fails identically against a bucket the same
credentials demonstrably can write. Set here rather than documented,
because a caller should not need to know a client-side default to publish
to the object store this script exists for, and leaving it to the
environment makes it work on one machine and not another.
`when_required` keeps checksums where the protocol needs them, so this is
narrower than switching them off.
Adds the test that would have caught it: an opt-in live round trip that
uploads, reads back and deletes, skipped unless a scratch bucket and
credentials are present so the offline run is unchanged. Everything else in
this suite proves the command is well formed, which is a different claim
from a server accepting it, and this failure lived exactly in that gap.
The live block captures the real credentials at the top of the file,
before the deliberate fakes (AKIAFAKETESTKEY) are exported for the offline
tests -- otherwise it authenticates as the fake and fails every time, and a
live test that always fails gets disabled, which is worse than not having
one.
Verified both directions against the real bucket: with the fix, 11 passed /
0 skipped; with it removed, the two live assertions fail. Offline, 9 passed
/ 1 skipped.
Closes#3.
Co-authored-by: bit <bit@das-labor.org>
Adds sign-apk.sh (align-check + apksigner), fdroid-update.sh (fdroid
update over a binary repo, signing the index with its own separate
key), publish.sh (S3-compatible upload) and the composite action
tying them together, matching weblib-ci's shape.
zipalign is not a standalone nixpkgs attribute; resolved by measurement
rather than assumption that Gradle/AGP already aligns its output (Android's
own docs, corroborated by fdroidserver never shelling out to zipalign) and
added check_zip_alignment.py as the safety net, since apksigner itself does
not check alignment at all. nixpkgs is pinned via a committed nixpkgs-pin
revision, since this repo has no flake.lock of its own for with-nixpkgs.sh
to read (fdroid-repo-ci#1, weblib-ci#9) -- a missing or malformed pin fails
loudly rather than degrading to an unpinned nix shell.
No consumer repo, bucket, hostname or channel name is hard-coded: which
repo holds the keys and runs the publish has already changed once during
this issue and may again, so every example uses a placeholder.
42 offline/local-only test assertions across five suites (run_tests.sh),
including fault injection on the alignment check, the password/argument
validation, and the with-nixpkgs.sh fail-loud paths.
Co-authored-by: bit <bit@das-labor.org>
claudeandbit