fdroid-repo-ci#6's "Superseded" sections change the rule: the candidate is
now the committer date of the commit being built, clamped on both sides,
rather than whatever minute the runner happened to pick the job up in.
Backwards: rebase, amend and cherry-pick can produce a commit older than
one already published, so the clamp keys off the committer date, not the
author date -- author date survives a rebase unchanged and would replay a
stale, already-superseded number.
Forwards: a commit's timestamp is attacker- and typo-controlled and the
number only ever rises, so a bad one can never be walked back. A value
placed just below the int32 ceiling would still publish and then no later
build could ever exceed it -- the app becomes permanently un-updatable.
TOLERANCE absorbs honest clock skew and the clamp warns loudly rather than
rejecting, since rejecting would block a legitimate build over a few
minutes of skew while buying nothing the clamp doesn't already cover.
next_version_code.py now takes the committer timestamp as a third
argument (Unix seconds, what `git log -1 --format=%ct` prints) instead of
reading the system clock, keeping it pure and testable without a git
checkout. next-version-code.sh, README.md and action.yml updated to match.
Granularity stays minutes: concurrency is handled separately (a
workflow-level concurrency group, plus publish.sh's refuse-on-existing),
so it is now a pure headroom choice.
Tests (test_next_version_code.py, test_next_version_code.sh): a normal
commit yields its own minute, a commit older than the published maximum
still yields published+1, a future-dated commit within tolerance passes
through untouched while one beyond it is clamped and warns, a commit
dated near the int32 ceiling does not produce a near-int32 result, and a
dedicated property test checks the result always strictly exceeds every
versionCode in the fixture across all of the above. Each was verified by
injecting the corresponding fault (removing the backwards clamp, removing
the forwards clamp, and ignoring the commit's date entirely) and
confirming the relevant test failed, then reverting.
98 assertions offline (0 failed, 4 skipped -- pre-existing, live-bucket
only), up from 91.
Co-authored-by: bit <bit@das-labor.org>
Closes#5Closes#6
An F-Droid repo is a signed index plus the files it names, and a partial
upload could previously leave them disagreeing: aws s3 sync walks the tree
in its own order, so an interrupted publish could land the index before the
APKs it names, breaking the repo for every client until the upload finished
or was rolled back. publish.sh now uploads in two passes, unconditionally --
every non-index file first, the index (index-v1.json(.asc), index-v2.json,
entry.json, entry.jar) last -- so an interruption anywhere in pass 1 simply
leaves the repo describing the old state a little longer, never a mixture.
Credentials are also verified with one real authenticated call
(head-bucket) before either pass, rather than merely checking the
environment variables are non-empty, since an unusable-but-present
credential failing halfway through is exactly how a partial upload happens.
next-version-code.sh is the one implementation of the versionCode rule
(candidate = minutes since 2026-01-01Z, clamped to strictly exceed whatever
is already published for that applicationId), shared by CI and manual
builds so there is exactly one place this can drift. bit pointed out
(appended to #6) that the clamp is monotonic against *observed* state, not
monotonic by construction: two jobs starting in the same minute can both
read the same published value and race to publish the same versionCode on
different APKs. Nothing can prevent that wasted build, so publish.sh now
also refuses to overwrite an already-existing APK object before pass 1 --
turning the collision from a silent, permanent wrong state into a loud
failure at the last moment the information is reliable.
Tested offline (83 assertions: pure-stdlib suites for both scripts, the
real CLIs through with-nixpkgs.sh, and a small local HEAD-only S3 stub
proving the credential check is a real authenticated call and the
APK-collision refusal fires only when it should) and live against
fdroid-weblib-dev (7 more: a real publish observed mid-flight via a
same-process synchronization hook to prove the index is genuinely absent
while the file is already present, both objects reading back
byte-identical, and a second publish refused against a real
already-published APK with its bytes left unchanged).
Co-authored-by: bit <bit@das-labor.org>
Adds sign-apk.sh (align-check + apksigner), fdroid-update.sh (fdroid
update over a binary repo, signing the index with its own separate
key), publish.sh (S3-compatible upload) and the composite action
tying them together, matching weblib-ci's shape.
zipalign is not a standalone nixpkgs attribute; resolved by measurement
rather than assumption that Gradle/AGP already aligns its output (Android's
own docs, corroborated by fdroidserver never shelling out to zipalign) and
added check_zip_alignment.py as the safety net, since apksigner itself does
not check alignment at all. nixpkgs is pinned via a committed nixpkgs-pin
revision, since this repo has no flake.lock of its own for with-nixpkgs.sh
to read (fdroid-repo-ci#1, weblib-ci#9) -- a missing or malformed pin fails
loudly rather than degrading to an unpinned nix shell.
No consumer repo, bucket, hostname or channel name is hard-coded: which
repo holds the keys and runs the publish has already changed once during
this issue and may again, so every example uses a placeholder.
42 offline/local-only test assertions across five suites (run_tests.sh),
including fault injection on the alignment check, the password/argument
validation, and the with-nixpkgs.sh fail-loud paths.
Co-authored-by: bit <bit@das-labor.org>
claudeandbit